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•	 S.C.’s voting machines do not have a voter-verified 
paper audit trail and it would cost about $17 million 
to add them. 
•	 The state has a few options concerning its voting 
machines including: 
" Keep the current machines as is or add a 
voter-verified paper audit trail. 
" Have a statewide procurement for new voting 
machines. 
"	 Approve different types of voting machines and 
have the counties purchase their own machines. 
•	 The statewide inventory of voting machines and 
database tracking the maintenance, replacement, or 
problems with the machines is still in the 
implementation phase. 
•	 State law should be amended to require that 
post-election tabulation audits be conducted for 
all elections before the votes are certified. 
•	 We found no evidence that county election 
commissioners and voter registration board members 
have been removed or replaced when they fail to 
comply with certification and training requirements. 
LAC.SC.GOV	 LAC/12-1 
 
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL 
1331 Elmwood Ave., Suite 315 
Columbia, SC 29201 
(803) 253-7612 VOICE 
(803) 253-7639 FAX 
Public Members 
Philip F. Laughridge, CPA, Chairman 
Mallory Factor, Vice Chairman 
Thomas F. Hartnett 
Jane P. Miller 
S. Jahue Moore, Esq. 
Members Who Serve Ex Officio 
Tom Young Jr. 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
Michael L. Fair 
Senate Finance Committee 
J. Roland Smith 
House Ways & Means Committee 
Walton J. McLeod 
House Judiciary Committee 
Director 
Perry K. Simpson 
Authorized by §2-15-10 et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws, the 
Legislative Audit Council, created in 1975, reviews the operations of state 
agencies, investigates fiscal matters as required, and provides information to 
assist the General Assembly. Some audits are conducted at the request of 
groups of legislators who have questions about potential problems in state 
agencies or programs; other audits are performed as a result of statutory 
mandate. 
The Legislative Audit Council is composed of five public members, one of 
whom must be a practicing certified or licensed public accountant and one of 
whom must be an attorney. In addition, four members of the General 
Assembly serve ex officio. 
Audits by the Legislative Audit Council are conducted in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards as set forth by the 
Comptroller General of the United States. 
Copies of all LAC audits are available at no charge. We encourage you to 
visit our website to view and print copies of LAC reports. 
LAC.SC.GOV 
A Review of Voting Machines in South Carolina 
was conducted by the following audit team. 
Deputy Director 
Andrea Derrick Truitt 
Auditors 
Kristina A. Hooks 
John C. Kresslein 
Amara A. Ransom 
Beverly T. Riley, CPA 
Typography 
Candice H. Pou 
Maribeth R. Werts 
Legal Counsel 







   S O U T H C A R O L I N A  G E N E R A L A S S E M B L Y 
Legislative Audit Council 
A REVIEW OF VOTING MACHINES 
IN SOUTH CAROLINA 





Audit Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
Chapter 1
 Scope and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
  
Introduction Background 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
  







Current Voting Machines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 
  
Other States’ Experiences With iVotronic Voting Machines . . . . . . . . . .  18 
  
Post-Election Audits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22 
  
Training for Election Officials and Precinct Managers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35 
  
Types of Voting Machines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41 
  
Agency Comments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47 
  Appendix 
Page iii LAC/12-1 Voting Machines 
Contents 




Audit Objectives The former President Pro Tempore of the South Carolina Senate requested a review of the voting machines used in South Carolina. He was concerned 
about the reliability of the machines and the lack of paper trail to confirm 
voting results. Our audit objectives were to: 
•	 Evaluate the voting machines currently in use in South Carolina and 
identify issues or concerns with the current system. 
•	 Determine if the training provided to election officials is adequate and 
appropriate. 
•	 Determine alternatives to the current voting machines and identify issues 
or concerns with those systems. 
Scope and 
Methodology 
We reviewed the voting machines used in South Carolina, the training 
provided to officials on using the machines, other types of voting machines, 
and other states’ experiences with the type of machines used in S.C. The 
period of review included FY 10-11 through FY 12-13 with consideration of 
earlier periods when relevant. To conduct the audit, we used evidence which 
included the following: 
•	 S.C. election audit files and reports. 
•	 Training records from the State Election Commission (SEC). 
•	 Surveys of S.C. county election officials. 
•	 Interviews with election officials in the counties, the SEC, and other 
states. 
•	 Information from election agencies in other states and the federal 
Election Assistance Commission. 
•	 Contracts and information from Election Systems & Software. 
•	 Information from the Budget and Control Board’s Information 
Technology Management Office. 
Criteria used to measure performance included state laws, federal laws, and 
SEC policies. We reviewed internal controls when reviewing the election 
audit files and the training records of election officials. Computerized data is 
the only source of votes recorded on the voting machines. We used the 
election audit files to identify concerns with this data. As the reliability of the 
machines is part of the audit objectives, we discuss this reliability in the 
report. 





We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards with the exception of the general standard 
concerning quality control. Due to LAC’s budget reductions, funding was not 
available for a timely external quality control review. In our opinion, this 
omission had no effect on the results of the audit. 
Those generally accepted government auditing standards require that we plan 
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis 
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Background The State Election Commission (SEC) is South Carolina’s chief election agency, and is responsible for overseeing election processes in the state. This 
includes responsibility for the statewide voting system, the voter registration 
system, and training of election officials. The mission of the SEC is “to 
ensure every eligible citizen has the opportunity to register to vote, 
participate in fair and impartial elections, and have the assurance that their 
vote will count.” The SEC provides oversight to county and municipal 
elections officials which includes assistance, training, and providing voter 
registration and election materials. 
The SEC is established in Chapter 3 of Title 7 of the S.C. Code of Laws. The 
commission consists of five members appointed by the Governor to four-year 
terms. The commission elects the executive director of the SEC and also 
serves as the Board of State Canvassers which is responsible for declaring 
persons elected and hearing election appeals. As of August 2012, the SEC 
employed 17 full-time, 3 temporary, and 3 contract employees. 
The SEC receives state general funds for operations, as well as earmarked 
funds, for conducting general and primary elections. For FY 12-13, the 
General Assembly appropriated almost $5 million for the SEC. 
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Table 1.1: SEC Revenues and 
Expenditures SOURCE OF FUNDS FY 09-10 FY 10-11 FY 11-12 
REVENUES 
Federal  $222,894  $159,543  $112,380 
General 63 60 92 
Operating 939,149 27,213 909,288 
Sale of List 99,953 98,050 109,022 
Capital Reserves 0 0 3,800,000 
Increased Enforcement 0 3,625,000 34,533 
Presidential Preference 
Primary 
0 0 180,000 
Restricted 4,054,923 39,741 59,275 
TOTAL $5,316,982 $3,949,607 $5,204,591 
EXPENDITURES 






The SEC used the state competitive procurement process in 2003 and 2004 to 
purchase the voting machines that South Carolina currently uses in its 
statewide voting system. After completing this process, the SEC decided to 
purchase Election Systems & Software iVotronic voting machines. The 
iVotronic model purchased by South Carolina is a direct-recording electronic 
(DRE) machine that does not produce a voter-verified paper audit trail 
(VVPAT). 
During this time, two Requests for Proposal (RFP) were issued, with the 
proposal and selection process followed for each. This was necessary 
because of several protests by vendors that took place after the selection of a 
vendor for the initial RFP. 
•	 In June 2003, the SEC began the process of developing an RFP and 
managing the vendor proposal evaluation. 
•	 By July 2003, the system requirements had been determined after 
obtaining feedback from state- and county-level election experts in 
South Carolina. 
•	 The SEC released the RFP to vendors in October 2003. 
•	 The SEC held an optional vendors’ conference in October 2003, for 
prospective offerors to ask questions about the RFP. 
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•	 Prospective offerors submitted protests against the RFP, as well as to 
SEC’s answers to questions about the RFP. Therefore, the solicitation 
process was suspended in October and December 2003. 
•	 Protests and appeals were filed, heard, and dismissed from October 2003 
through January 2004. 
•	 The solicitation process resumed on January 15, 2004. The SEC had 
originally planned to issue an intent to award for the contract in the first 
quarter of 2004, but revised this to the second quarter because of delays 
caused by protests. 
•	 Six vendors submitted proposals by February 9, 2004. The three 
proposals that were determined responsive were evaluated by a panel of 
one state-level election expert and seven county-level experts, who 
selected these vendors to give oral presentations to the committee. 
•	 Based on the committee’s recommendation, on April 12, 2004, the SEC 
issued an intent to award a contract to ES&S for the statewide voting 
system. 
•	 Four of the unsuccessful vendors filed protests in response to the intent 
to award. The State Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) then conducted an 
administrative review, and determined, in June 2004, ES&S had not met 
the requirements of the RFP, and that the solicitation for the contract 
must be rebid. 
•	 SEC issued a second RFP for the statewide voting system in June 2004. 
In June 2004, the State Procurement Review Panel held an administrative 
review hearing. It upheld the CPO’s determination that the original ES&S 
proposal was nonresponsive and that the solicitation must be reissued. An 
evaluation panel for the second solicitation was selected by the SEC and 
based on the state’s Help America Vote Act (HAVA) State Plan Advisory 
Team suggestions. This evaluation panel consisted of five election experts. 
Based on the panel’s recommendation, a multiterm contract was awarded on 
August 4, 2004, to ES&S for the statewide uniform voting system. The initial 
contract period was from August 4, 2004, through December 31, 2006, with 
the option to renew yearly thereafter until June 30, 2011, which is the 
maximum length allowed by state law without additional approval by the 
Budget and Control Board. 
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In 2004 and 2005, the SEC purchased 9,393 iVotronic touch screen voting 
machines from ES&S for a total of $28,132,035 and 2,005 ADA-approved 
iVotronic machines at a total of $6,405,975. At that time, SEC also 
purchased an additional 50 voting machines to be used as supervisor 
terminals. We were unable to determine the cost for maintenance, training, 
and support. In addition, South Carolina counties must pay ES&S a separate 
fee for any parts needed for maintenance. The machines were purchased 
using federal grant money and state funds. 
After the contract expired on June 30, 2011, the SEC contracts with ES&S 
for maintenance of the machines owned by the state. Currently, South 
Carolina has no contract with any vendor to purchase any type of voting 
machine or for modification of the machines the state already owns. 
According to an SEC official, the agency has requested $5 million to begin 
the process of procuring a new statewide voting system. However, that 
process cannot begin until the EAC approves new voting standards and 
vendors begin manufacturing new voting systems according to those 
standards. It is unknown when the EAC will approve the new standards, 
when new voting systems will be available to the state, and what the cost of 
those systems will be. Additionally, the official stated that the SEC does not 
believe that it would be cost effective to equip the voting machines currently 
being used in the state with VVPAT technology, due to the age of the 
machines and the estimated cost of over $15 million to make the 
modification. 











We evaluated the voting machines currently used in South Carolina to 
identify any issues or concerns. We found that there have been errors 
attributed to some of the machines. The voting machine South Carolina uses 
is not certified by the federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC). 
Current machines do not produce paper audit trails. To address this, it would 
cost $17 million to add a voter verifiable paper audit trail to the voting 
machines. 
Legal Requirements for 
Voting Machines 
In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) which 
encouraged the replacement of punch card/lever based voting systems and 
created the Election Assistance Commission, which established minimum 
requirements for voting systems used in federal elections. The minimum 
requirements for a voting system states that it shall permit the voter to verify 
in a private and independent manner the votes selected on the ballot before 
the ballot is cast and counted, provide the voter the opportunity to privately 
and independently change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is 
cast and counted, notify the voter if more than one candidate is selected for a 
single office and overall, preserve the privacy and confidentiality of the 
ballot. 
In creating the EAC, HAVA tasked it with creating and updating Voluntary 
Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), which outline specifications and 
requirements that systems are to be built to and tested against. The EAC is 
currently without its four commissioners and has not revised the 2005 
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. The EAC does provide weekly updates 
on four machines that are being tested. The EAC is also in the process of a 
90-day public comment period for the VVSG version 1.1. This version 
provides updates to requirements in the areas of security, reliability, 
usability, accessibility and enhances the testability and clarity of several 
requirements in the former version. The implementation of the updated 
guidelines will not occur without having a quorum of commissioners. 
According to an EAC official, lack of a quorum of commissioners does not 
affect the testing and certification of voting systems except in accrediting 
new test laboratories or if a voting system manufacturer wants to appeal a 
decertification decision. The Testing and Certification Division continues to 
test and certify voting systems, conduct quality monitoring of voting 
systems, and renew laboratory accreditations for voting system test 
laboratories. 





The VVSG states that the guidelines are voluntary, each state can decide 
whether to require voting systems used in its state to have national 
certification. States may decide to adopt the guidelines in whole or in part, at 
any time. States may specify additional requirements that voting systems in 
their jurisdictions must meet. 
S.C. Code §7-13-1640 establishes the requirements for voting machines used 
in South Carolina. South Carolina’s requirements adhere to the minimum 
requirements found in HAVA, such as ensuring “absolute secrecy,” and that 
the system provides a “protective counter” or “protective device” whereby 
any operation of the machine before or after the election will be detected, and 
a counter which shows at all times during the election how many persons 
have voted. S.C. Code §7-13-1620 (A) further requires that: 
...a voting system may not be approved for use in the State unless 
certified by a testing laboratory accredited by the Federal Election 
Assistance Commission as meeting or exceeding the minimum 
requirements of federal voting system standards. 
The SEC selected the iVotronic DRE made by Election Systems and 
Software (ES&S) as the statewide voting machine (see Procurement of 
Voting Machines). Voters cast their votes for each race and/or ballot 
proposition by touching the screen. It allows disabled citizens to vote 
independently. The iVotronic is intended to prevent the voter from over-
voting and to alert the voter of under-voted races. Voters may review their 
ballots electronically prior to casting their votes. 
Certification Process for 
Voting Machines 
South Carolina uses ES&S iVotronic version 3.0.1.1 voting system which 
has not been certified by the EAC. It is certified by the National Association 
of State Election Directors (NASED), the predecessor of the EAC. System 
version 3.0.1.1 has been tested by SysTest Laboratory now known as SLI 
Global Solutions. The EAC has never tested any version of the ES&S 
iVotronic. Voting systems certified by NASED were not grandfathered into 
the EAC program. If a system was NASED-certified, it would have to 
undergo the full testing and certification process at the EAC to become an 
EAC-certified voting system. S.C. Code §7-13-1620 (A) requires that the 
voting machine system be certified by a laboratory that is EAC-accredited. 
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The EAC is responsible for the testing and certification of voting machines. 
Laboratories accredited by the EAC test and certify machines against voting 
standards provided in the VVGS. To ensure systems meet applicable 
standards in design and build, three levels of tests are generally performed: 
•	 Qualification tests are performed by independent testing authorities to 
ensure both the EAC’s and the systems’ design standards are met. 
•	 Certification tests determine how well the systems conform to individual 
state laws, requirements, and practices. 
•	 Acceptance tests are performed by local procuring jurisdictions to 
determine whether the equipment, as delivered and installed, satisfies the 
jurisdiction’s functional and performance requirements. 
Beyond these levels of testing, jurisdictions perform routine maintenance and 
diagnostic activities to ensure proper system performance. 
South Carolina is 1 of 12 states that require federal certification of voting 
machines. “Although participation in the program is voluntary, adherence to 
the program’s procedural requirements is mandatory for participants.” The 
State Election Commission (SEC) approves the voting system. The approval 
process requires, among other things: 
•	 The voting system (hardware and software) be certified by an Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC) accredited independent testing authority. 
•	 The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s National Software 
Reference Library examines the source code to ensure no extraneous 
code is present. 
•	 The SEC reviews the voting system for compliance with laws. 
The certification of the state’s current voting machines is questionable 
because of the timing of the certification and the accreditation of the testing 
laboratory. SysTest Lab tested and recommended ES&S Unity 3.0.1.1 voting 
system on or before June 21, 2006. The EAC adopted its Voting System 
Testing and Certification Program on July 13, 2006. In its initial 
implementation phase, SysTest Lab was granted interim accreditation on 
August 15, 2006, and later granted full accreditation on February 21, 2007. 
Upon request by the SEC’s chairman, an opinion of the attorney general 
concluded that the state cannot approve a voting system certified by a 
laboratory, which at the time of certification was not accredited by the EAC. 
Electronic voting was initially implemented in only 19 counties in November 
2004, and then later expanded to all 46 counties. Prior to the establishment of 
the EAC, voting systems were qualified to 2002 Voting System Standards by 
NASED. The following timeline shows the certification process for the 
state’s iVotronic machines. 
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accredited by EAC 
Source: NASED and EAC reports. 
State law requires that systems be approved by a testing laboratory accredited 
by the EAC. The voting machine itself is not certified by the EAC, but the 
laboratory that tests the machine is accredited by the EAC. SLI Global, 
formerly SysTest Lab, was accredited through July 16, 2011; however, the 
EAC cannot vote to renew accreditation without commissioners. The EAC’s 
Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual states that a grant of 
accreditation is valid for a period not to exceed two years. Laboratories that 
timely file the renewal application package shall retain their accreditation 
while the review and processing of their application is pending. 
S.C. Code §7-13-1620 (G) states that an improvement or change in an 
approved voting system must be submitted to the State Election Commission 
for approval. The EAC-accredited test lab will determine tests necessary to 
certify the modified system based on a review of the nature and scope of 
changes. Any changes and/or upgrades to the voting system that require a 
release or version number change will require the vendor to seek applicable 
ITA and state certification before the voting system’s software or firmware is 
approved for use in South Carolina. 
The statutory requirement that the state’s voting system be approved by an 
EAC-accredited laboratory hinders the state’s ability to modify or replace the 
current voting system. The SEC can follow its own certification process 
without federal certification required to provide more flexibility. 





An opinion of the S.C. Attorney General concluded that the provision 
requiring certification by a laboratory is constitutionally suspect as an 
unlawful delegation of legislative power to a federal agency. Twenty 
states/territories have no federal requirement for voting standards. For 
example, New Hampshire has no federal requirements for voting standards. 
New Hampshire’s Ballot Law Commission determines the rules for the 
certification of voting systems. New Hampshire uses a paper ballot voting 
system. 
Recommendation 1.	 The General Assembly should amend S.C. Code §7-13-1620 (A) to remove the requirement that a voting system must be certified by an 
Election Assistance Commission accredited laboratory and add a 
requirement that the voting system be approved by a testing authority 
selected by the State Election Commission. 
Tracking, Maintenance 
and Replacement of 
Voting Machines 
Providing for the use, custody, and repair of voting machines has been the 
responsibility of counties since the initial deployment of machines, as 
required by S.C. Code §7-13-1680. According to an SEC official, the SEC 
negotiates maintenance contracts on behalf of counties, but the expense is 
paid by counties. To replace failing machines, ES&S sells refurbished 
machines from its inventory and reconditions them to current EAC standards. 
ES&S or an authorized representative of ES&S repairs the machines. When 
maintenance is needed, counties should contact ES&S immediately. Only 
parts certified at the federal and state level are used to repair machines. If 
voting machines cannot be repaired, ES&S provides a new unit or a 
refurbished unit from its inventory. The SEC is in the process of 
implementing the inventory, tracking, and maintenance practices established 
in its security guide. The guide states that: 
•	 An effective asset management and inventory control system should be 
implemented for all components of the voting system. 
•	 The SEC will maintain an inventory and version identification 
(configuration management) of the voting system components inclusive 
of documentation, hardware, software, and communication components. 
•	 A procedure should be established so vendors notify the SEC regarding 
any problems found in the voting system. 
•	 A database should be maintained to document and track each problem in 
order to keep counties and the public informed. 
•	 A similar procedure should be established for counties, so that other 
counties are aware of “possible trends and solutions.” 





In September 2012, the statewide Voter Registration and Elections 
Management System (VREMS) Asset Management application was 
implemented in one county, with five other counties seeking access to the 
application. This application encompasses all aspects of managing equipment 
and inventory including maintenance and repairs. The SEC does not have the 
ability to require counties to use the application. The SEC provides a help 
desk where counties can post questions about Unity and the iVotronic voting 
system. For the iVotronic system, S.C. Code §7-13-1620 (I) (1) states that: 
A vendor of any voting system that has been approved by the State 
Election Commission shall report in writing to the Director of the 
State Election Commission any decertification, ethical, or technical 
violations against the voting system in any state within ninety days 
after the decertification, ethical, or technical violations are issued 
by the other state. 
The SEC reports there have been no recent notifications from its voting 
machine vendor, ES&S, concerning the version of Unity or iVotronic voting 
machine used in South Carolina. Technical bulletins are available through the 
ES&S web portal. 
Security Measures of 
Machines and Their 
Effectiveness 
The SEC has developed the election security guide to maintain the security 
and integrity of elections in the state. The guide was originally drafted in 
February 2004. The SEC issued the latest revised version in January 2013 
which was the first revision since September 2004. The guidelines provide 
policies, plans, and best practices for the administration of the elections 
process from the inventory, maintenance, storage, and tracking of machines 
by counties, and a Quick Start Election Security Checklist, instructions for 
conducting an integrity audit to the pre-election, during and post-election 
processes. 
2.	 The State Election Commission should continue implementation of its Recommendations application to track the inventory, maintenance and replacement of 
voting machines in the counties. 
3.	 The State Election Commission should update the Election Security 
guide regularly. Policies should be developed to reduce inconsistencies 
of procedures among counties, the redundancy of errors throughout 
counties, and increase the awareness of the SEC to issues occurring 
throughout the state. 







Election Day Problems	 Election Day mishaps with the ES&S voting systems and vote tabulations 
have been reported nationwide and South Carolina is no exception. 
According to the Sun News in Myrtle Beach, election officials incorrectly 
programmed the voting machines to close on the wrong date, “In both 
counties (Florence and Horry), the voting machines were incorrectly set to 
close on January 26, the date of the Democratic presidential primary, instead 
of January 19, the date the Republican primary was held.” Republican 
primary results were thus delayed as officials could not access the data until 
technicians manually closed each machine. During polling, voters in Horry 
County also complained of malfunctioning machines; according to the 
newspaper, supplies of emergency paper ballots “were running out.” 
According to The State in Columbia, in the November 2005 election, initial 
vote totals in the Republican and Democratic primary races for a county 
council seat, showed that 3,208 votes had been cast in district 2. A manual 
count discovered that only 768 votes had been cast. Election officials 
suspected that the error had occurred because machine cartridges were 
incorrectly programmed to record some votes more than once. A state 
election official apparently did not check a box that would have prevented 
multiple readings. 
During the 2012 general election, Richland County had significant problems. 
Voters were still in line waiting to vote at 11:30 p.m. election night. At least 
20% of the county’s precincts, plus absentee votes, were not counted until 
Wednesday evening, following a scanner breaking numerous times. Voters 
complained there were fewer voting machines than supplied in previous 
elections. At one Spartanburg precinct, machines were not working and the 
precinct ran out of provisional ballots twice so workers wrote down voters’ 
numbers to call or text voters to return once issues were resolved. County 
election officials continue to remain unsure why machines failed. 
Colleton County also had Election Day errors in November 2010. Several 
factors caused its certified vote count to be greater than the number of people 
who went to the polls. A study conducted by the SEC found that erroneous 
results were caused by human error in the vote tabulation process (see SEC 
Vote Tabulation Audits). Similarities between Richland County’s 2012 
general election and Colleton County’s 2010 election can be drawn from 
having too few voting machines at precincts, a number of precincts with over 
1,500 registered voters, and broken voting machines. 
These are just a few of the reported errors in South Carolina, largely 
categorized as human errors rather than mechanical errors. 






Mechanical errors have occurred, such as battery failure and screen 
calibration, directly impacting voters’ ability to vote timely and accurately. 
An invoice from Berkeley County’s Board of Voter Registration shows 329 
replacement batteries were ordered March 2010, for $59.95 per unit totaling 
$19,723.55. A rover report (machine technician’s report) showing problems 
with machines on voting day lists eight calls from Berkeley County on 
Election Day, June 8, 2010, for machines not having zero tape (receipt-like 
paper that shows voting machine tabulation count to be zero), battery 
problems, needing calibration, and machines not functioning. 
Security Audit	 In 2008, the SEC contracted with a security firm to conduct a two-fold 
security assessment of each of the county election commission offices 
concerning the Election Management System (EMS) computers and voting 
equipment, and to assist the SEC in further development of security policies 
related to the computers and electronic voting equipment. All 46 county 
election offices were visited and the audit team found: 
•	 Computers connected to networks or telephone lines that could 
potentially be used from unsecured or unauthorized access, though no 
wireless networks were found to be connected. 
•	 Nearly all locations actively tracked who had keys to sensitive areas but 
only three-quarters changed keys and security codes after each holder 
ends his/her relationships and only half log entry to sensitive areas. 
•	 Only six in ten offices archive changes in assets such as computers or 
election equipment. 
•	 Nine in ten sites kept a log showing details of EMS computers and any 
transfers. 
Recommendations included changing keys/codes to sensitive areas after 
holders end their relationships with the organization, backing up the tracking 
system regularly, and keeping an audit log showing all equipment 
identification codes, such as serial numbers and the dates and personnel of all 
transfers. 
Without consistency among counties and full development and enforcement 
of security standards, the effectiveness of the SEC’s security guide and 
security audit recommendations are limited. 






Set-Up and Testing of 
Machines 
Voting machines undergo a series of tests prior to Election Day. The 
National Certification Testing process includes tests of usability, 
functionality, hardware, software, and quality assurance. According to an 
SEC official, the SEC and counties go through a quality assurance process to 
test machines by using them just as voters would on Election Day, both 
electronically and manually. Acceptance tests are conducted by local 
jurisdictions to ensure machines function properly and are correctly 
configured for use in an election. This test is to be conducted on every unit of 
the voting system every time a unit leaves the custody of the election office. 
Survey Results	 We conducted a survey of county election officials with questions focusing 
on the maintenance, tracking, and replacement of machines. Of the 46 
counties surveyed, 29 (63%) responded. 
•	 On average, $23,000 is spent by counties for the annual maintenance of 
voting machines. 
•	 Roughly 90% of the respondents stated there is written documentation 
from the SEC to counties describing both counties and SEC’s 
responsibilities for the maintenance, tracking, and replacement of voting 
machines. 
•	 All respondents confirmed they have a contingency plan in place in the 
event machine failure occurs during an election. 
•	 Only 5 (17%) counties have replaced machines, with an average of 2 
machine replacements per county.
•	 All counties named ES&S or its contractor as vendors that repair and 
replace voting machines. 
•	 Machine problems among counties varied from normal wear, 
motherboard failure, screen-calibration to battery failure, and PEBs 
(Personalized Electronic Ballots) “going bad.” 63% of counties that have 
had problems with machines have not reported them to the SEC. 
•	 All of the counties stated that voting machines are tested prior to each 
election, which includes following the SEC election guide, 
manufacturers guide, clearing machines, and sample voting. 
•	 71% of respondents stated acceptance tests are conducted on machines 
anytime they leave the custody of county election offices. 
•	 83% of the counties stated that machines undergo acceptance tests after 
maintenance. 
•	 When asked about the methods used to track and inventory voting 
machines, counties have different methods — manual, bar-coding, excel 
spreadsheets, labeling, and serial numbers. 





Possibility of Adding a 
Paper Audit Trail 
ES&S iVotronic voting machines currently used in South Carolina are 
paperless and do not allow voters to verify their votes by paper nor do the 
machines produce an auditable paper trail, such as the voter verified paper 
audit trail (VVPAT) system. VVPAT provides a paper recording of the 
voter’s intent that rolls on a thermal paper printer where a voter can verify 
that the vote is recorded correctly. South Carolina is one of six states that 
uses paperless electronic voting machines. The system stores votes in three 
places, one of which creates an electronic data file also called an audit log. At 
the time of the initial procurement of the ES&S iVotronic, the SEC inquired 
about the cost of retrofitting voting devices should VVPATs become 
required by federal or state legislation. Without paper ballots, the 
reconstruction of the votes cast is not possible. According to ES&S, adding 
its version of VVPAT, the Real-Time Audit Log (RTAL), to South 
Carolina’s existing voting systems would cost $1,445 per unit, not including 
shipping and handling fees. With approximately 12,000 units in the state, the 
cost of adding RTAL would be $17,340,000. 
VVPATs have been reported to add a level of complexity to the voting 
process, requiring more attention from poll workers to ensure it is 
functioning properly. Current iVotronic models used in South Carolina do 
not enable a hand count of ballots to compare to the electronic records to 
ensure the validity of an election. While hand counts have been considered a 
standard procedure to guard against miscounts and in finding anomalies, it 
brings in the factor of human error and adding an additional counter has been 
found to produce errors as well. If VVPAT ballots are unable to be easily 
counted without error, it is not fulfilling its role as a reliable audit system. It 
is unclear if the cost of adding on VVPATs provides the intended return on 
cost through enhanced security. It also undermines the voting access of 
people with disabilities. VVPATs’ most important property may be that they 
provide verification of ballots physically separate from the DRE. The 




States were required by federal law to implement a plan to improve upon 
their elections process. South Carolina submitted a plan, as required by 
HAVA, in 2006 that the state would improve its compliance with the election 
process. ES&S has provided documentation stating that, when machines are 
repaired or replaced, they are done so to EAC and state standards, using only 
certified parts. ES&S’s sales order agreement warrants to customers that at 
the time of delivery, the equipment and licensed software will comply with 
all applicable requirements of the state election laws and regulations that are 
mandatory and effective. 
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During the warranty period, as long as the customer is subscribing and 
paying for maintenance and support services, the equipment and license 
software will be maintained or upgraded by ES&S to remain compliant. 
Customers are responsible for the cost. As of December 5, 2012, 
Williamsburg County was the only county not current with its hardware 
maintenance agreement with ES&S, according to ES&S’s finance 
department. 
It is the policy of ES&S to distribute only state and federal certified 
hardware, software, and firmware for customer use. According to its 
shipment policy: 
... all customer production shipments sent from ES&S, its 
authorized manufacturers or company representatives, must be 
verified against the NEWS customer service database’s 
certification page to ensure that only state and federal certified 
hardware, software, and firmware is distributed to customer. 
ES&S’s customer repair and return distribution policy states all customer 
repairs and return shipments sent from ES&S shall be authorized by the 
return material authorization (RMA) department. The department will ensure 
that the hardware, software, or firmware being returned to the customer has 
the correct state certified version. 
A group of voters from Pennsylvania formally requested the re-examination 
of the iVotronic voting system. On February 29, 2012, the laboratory 
contracted by Pennsylvania tested ES&S iVotronic voting system version 
9.1.4.1 and Unity software version 3.0.1.0. The objective of the 
re-examination was to examine the system, previously certified for use in 
Pennsylvania on April 7, 2006, to determine whether the system remains 
compliant with requirements of the Pennsylvania Election Code. The voting 
system was found to be in compliance and was re-certified for use in 
Pennsylvania. 










We reviewed other states’ experiences with the iVotronic voting machines to 
identify any concerns with those machines. While South Carolina has not 
reported many of these problems, we found that other states have had 
problems with the machines and some have decertified these machines or no 
longer use them. Some states operate hotlines where voters can report 
problems using voting machines; however, South Carolina does not have a 
hotline. 
Voting Machine Studies	 Versions of ES&S’s iVotronic voting machine have been a subject of several 
studies over the past few years including: 
•	 A 2006 review of Webb County, Texas’s ES&S iVotronic voting system 
was initiated by an incorrect vote tally for the March 2006 primary 
election. The report concluded that it was likely some of the machines in 
question were not set to the correct date on Election Day, so previous test 
votes were reported and erroneously included in the official election 
tallies. 
•	 A 2007 study found that ES&S’s DRE and optical scan voting systems 
used in Ohio and many other jurisdictions in the United States, including 
iVotronic machines, had numerous vulnerabilities in almost every 
component, including many security flaws that had not been detected by 
the authorities who certified them for use. 
•	 A Florida State University (FSU) information technology security team 
was commissioned by the Florida Department of State as part of an audit 
of the 2006 Florida Congressional District 13 (Sarasota County) election 
in which about 18,000 votes were lost from the iVotronic machines. The 
team found faults with the iVotronic machines, including that the 
software was vulnerable to attack for a variety of reasons, as well as 
insufficient ability to secure passwords at the physical voting machines. 
The study did not identify a cause for the undervote. The team did a 
follow-up report later that year and found that while ES&S took steps to 
correct these flaws and made significant improvements, some flaws 
remained that allowed the iVotronic voting system to continue to be at 
risk of producing incorrect election results. This follow-up report stated 
that the remaining flaws require election officials using iVotronic 
terminals to use “terminal protection procedures that go well beyond 
those in common practice.” 






•	 In 2007, after the FSU study, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) conducted a study on the cause of the undervotes in this Florida 
election. The GAO reported that it could not identify a particular voting 
machine or any voting machine characteristics that could have caused the 
undervote. However, it also reported that the tests and reviews performed 
by Florida and Sarasota County prior to elections did not, by themselves, 
provide reasonable assurance that the iVotronic machines did not 
contribute to the election’s undervote. 
•	 The League of Women Voters of South Carolina conducted a study of 
the November 2, 2010, South Carolina election results. They found that 
the iVotronic voting machines in use were unreliable, and their election 
results could not be verified. The authors recommended that South 
Carolina regularly perform post-election audits (see Post-Election 
Audits). 
Problems With Other 
States' iVotronic 
Machines 
We examined the problems with iVotronic machines that have been reported 
in United States elections. Some are due to issues with the machines 
themselves while others are a result of weaknesses in the voting process due 
to the use of the machines. 
Vote Flipping 
Vote flipping is a term used to describe when a voter makes his or her 
selection on a voting machine, and then the machine changes that selection to 
another option on the review screen that the voter did not select. This has 
been reported on iVotronic voting machines in Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, 
Ohio, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Some of the 
most recent reports came from North Carolina during the early election 
period for the November 2012 general election. 
Candidates Missing From Screens 
In states such as Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Ohio, voters have 
reported that candidates who should have been on the ballot did not appear 
on the screens of the iVotronic machines on which they were assigned to 
vote. 
Missing Votes (Undervotes) or Too Many Votes (Overvotes) 
There have been reports of lost votes, or fewer recorded votes than voters, in 
several states. For example, there was an undervote of approximately 18,000 
for one race in the 2006 Florida general election in Sarasota County; over 
238,000 votes were counted in the election. In addition to votes being lost, 
there have also been reports of more votes counted than there were votes 
cast. 
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Delayed or Unrecognized Acceptance of Votes 
There have been numerous reports of iVotronic machines: (1) accepting and 
acknowledging a voter’s selection after abnormal delay; (2) requiring the 
voter to repeatedly and/or with extra force tap the screen in order for the 
selection to be accepted; or (3) failing to recognize that the voter made a 
selection on the touch screen. This has been cited as an obstacle to accurate 
vote counts. 
ES&S has acknowledged these problems. It told state and county election 
officials that they were due to faulty ES&S software used to operate the 
machines, and that the software needed to be upgraded. It warned Florida 
election officials prior to the 2006 general election that this could cause 
voters difficulty in casting their ballots. At least one county in Florida chose 
not to use the iVotronic machines in that election due to the problem. 
Election Fraud 
An incident in Clay County, Kentucky showed that the iVotronic machines 
can be unsecure during voting even if the machines have not been altered. In 
that county, voters were instructed that their votes were cast when they 
reached the review screen rather than the final voting screen. Poll workers 
would then enter the voting booths, change the selections, and cast the 
ballots. Members of the county’s board of elections had bribed poll workers 
to falsely instruct voters of the correct voting procedures, and then change 
their votes. Eight board members were tried, convicted, and sentenced to 
federal prison. If voters are not properly educated on the correct procedures 
for using machines, their votes are vulnerable to being changed without their 
knowledge. 
Freezing 
There have been a number of reports of iVotronic machines “freezing,” or 
getting stuck, during the process of a voter making selections before actually 
casting the ballot. Some have come from voters, and others have been found 
in written notes from field technicians describing the phenomenon as they 
attempted to repair the machines on Election Day. For example, there have 
been voters who experienced this problem and alerted poll workers; although 
the poll workers and technicians tried to help, these machines were 
eventually shut down and the voters were moved to other machines. 






A short battery life (just a few years, which is far less than the expected 
lifetime of the machines) and the replacement cost have been problematic for 
several states. There are also reports that batteries have stopped working 
without warning during voting. Some iVotronic machines in other states have 
stopped working or have needed to be removed from use during voting hours 
because of low or dead batteries. The batteries are intended to provide a 
backup in case power is not available. 
Use of Machines in 
Other States 
In 2012, 18 states and the District of Columbia had jurisdictions that used 
these machines. Eight states used iVotronic machines with VVPAT, eleven 
used machines without VVPAT, and one had jurisdictions that used both 
types. Most states had not implemented statewide voting systems. Instead, 
they certify voting machines at the state level, as South Carolina does, but 
allow each jurisdiction to choose and purchase their own types of voting 
systems. Therefore, some states that have used iVotronic voting machines 
have had a range of only one jurisdiction using these machines to the 
majority of jurisdictions in the state using them. 
We contacted other states that have used iVotronic voting machines. These 
states reported the following information: 
•	 Colorado discovered that a magnet placed near the PEB slot can cause 
the machine to not operate. Colorado decertified the iVotronic machines, 
and then recertified them after it issued conditions for use of the 
machines. 
•	 Florida reported that there were no major problems with iVotronic voting 
machines during its past elections (other than batteries that needed 
replacement). However, as a result of legislation, the iVotronic machines 
will no longer be compliant with Florida statues by 2016. Currently, they 
can only be used by Florida counties as accessible voting devices for the 
disabled under HAVA requirements. Florida election officials informed 
us that those are being replaced by paper ballots or the ES&S 
AutoMARK optical scanner tabulation machine. 
•	 Pennsylvania election officials replied that they could not respond to our 
iVotronic-related questions due to current litigation. 






Election Hotlines In addition, South Carolina does not provide a statewide hotline for voters to
report problems with voting. Other states, such as Florida, Ohio, and 
Tennessee, and some South Carolina counties, such as Berkeley, Charleston, 
and Dorchester, have provided such a hotline. If the State Election 
Commission were to provide an election hotline, this could help to resolve 
problems as they occur on Election Day, identify issues with the machines, 
and may reassure South Carolina voters that any voting problem encountered 
may be addressed. 
Recommendation 4. The State Election Commission should establish and maintain a hotline for voters to call during elections to report problems, including those 
relating to any voting machines in use. A list of the reported problems 
should be maintained to identify issues with the voting machines. 
Post-Election 
Audits 
We reviewed the post-election audit process adopted by the State Election 
Commission (SEC) since 2010. We found that while the process has value 
and can assure citizens that all votes recorded by the machines have been 
accounted for, the audit process is limited by the absence of a voter verifiable 
paper audit trail (VVPAT). The SEC website does not include any obvious 
indication that the audit reports exist, and there are no instructions for 
locating the reports or analyses that help a reader understand the reports once 
they are located. The SEC should more clearly indicate the location of the 
audit reports and include in the reports explanations of the various report 
comments, terms, and phrases used so that the reports can be understood by 
anyone. In the absence of a voter verifiable paper trail, we conclude that, 
while this post-election process has value, it is a post-election vote tabulation 
audit and we use that phrase to refer to this process in this section.
Post-election audits can ensure that all votes recorded on a machine are 
accounted for, identify precincts with problems, identify training needs for 
future elections, identify machines in need of repair, and help to determine 
machine allocation requirements in future elections. State and local officials 
should use the information derived from these audits not only to reassure 
voters that all votes captured by each machine are accounted for, but to 
improve the overall election process in upcoming elections. 





Many counties rely on the SEC to run the audits. In some cases, local 
officials feel that they are unqualified to conduct the audits. The SEC offers 
initial and follow-up training to local officials at no cost. The SEC should 
also provide local officials with instructional videos available online that can 
be accessed at any time by local officials whenever they have a question that 
cannot be resolved by the training manuals produced by the SEC. 
Background	 An election audit involves procedures examining one or more components of 
an overall voting system. The purpose of the audit will dictate its scope 
which can range from limited which documents vote tabulations, to 
something broader incorporating both pre- and post-election processes. It 
serves as a check on the election process and depending on its scope, may 
provide evidence that the equipment used by the voters to cast their votes as 
well as the equipment, processes, and procedures for counting votes worked 
properly; that the votes were counted as cast; and that the election outcome 
was correct given the votes cast. 
Audits are seen as a way to improve public confidence in the election process 
and, if done correctly, provide voters with some assurance that any problems 
with the election were identified and corrected for future elections. Unlike 
those that exist for financial auditing or other auditing, there are no 
professional standards for performing election audits. 
To be effective, election audits generally require a paper trail, a hard copy of 
voter intent that the voter has the opportunity to review for accuracy. On 
electronic voting machines, that opportunity exists if there is a voter-
verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) printer attached. If no such VVPAT 
printer is attached, then the voters have nothing independent of the software, 
that displays choices on the screen, with which they can confirm that the 
voter’s intent was accurately captured by the machine. For an entity to be 
auditable in a comprehensive fashion, there must be records, processes, and 
procedures in place to audit. If not, then the entity is not auditable. South 
Carolina uses iVotronic voting machines in every county without voter 
verifiable paper audit trails. 







South Carolina Law 
Governing Machine 
Audits 
South Carolina has no law governing post-election audits. However, 
§7-13-1655 (A) (1) of the South Carolina Code of Laws defines a “voting 
system” as:
 ... the total combination of mechanical, electromechanical, or 
electronic equipment, including the software, firmware, and 
documentation required to program, control, and support the 
equipment that is used to….maintain and produce audit trail 
information. 
Federal and Other State 
Laws 
Federal Law 
Federal law does not require that states perform post-election audits, but 
requires that a voting system used in a federal election shall produce a 
permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity. The paper record is to 
be available as an official record for any recount. The federal law’s definition 
of a voting system is the same as South Carolina’s concerning an audit trail. 
In an opinion issued in 2004, South Carolina’s Attorney General wrote that, 
while the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires that voting 
systems produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity to 
enable election officials to conduct fair and accurate recounts, the act does 
not require that such paper trail be seen and verified by the voter after it is 
produced, nor that voters be issued a paper receipt of their votes. 
The opinion discusses some of the potential practical and legal problems with 
a voter-verified paper trail, including a greater potential for voter fraud and 
intimidation, threats to the principle of a secret ballot, longer delays, and 
additional costs for voting. 
Other States 
We identified 26 states and the District of Columbia with statutes requiring 
post-election audits. Of the states we identified as having election audit 
statutes, 19 use DREs. Of those 19, 11 have machines with voter verifiable 
paper trails. Nine states do not have voter verifiable paper trails. One state, 
Colorado, has a combination of DREs with and without paper trails. Some of 
these audit laws apply equally to direct recording electronic systems (DRE) 
equipped with voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) and optical scan 
systems. New Jersey has a law mandating post-election audits, but its voting 
machines lack a paper trail, a condition which makes audits aimed at 
ensuring that voter intent is reflected in what is captured by the voting 
machine impossible. New Jersey reports that it does not conduct post-
election audits. Tennessee has a statute but has delayed implementation. 






Two other states, Ohio and Missouri, conduct audits pursuant to directive of 
the Secretary of State (Ohio) and regulation (Missouri). 
Election Day Procedures	 On Election Day, before voting begins, the poll manager activates each 
voting machine verifying the date and time on the voting device and the 
precinct. Poll managers run a tape showing a zero total for each machine in 
order to verify that no votes are recorded on the machines. There is a master 
personal electronic ballot (PEB), a hand-held device that is used to open the 
machine to be used by voters and close the machine once it is no longer in 
use on Election Day.
After a voter checks in at the voter registration desk and is approved to vote, 
the poll manager uses a different PEB to activate the appropriate ballot for 
that voter. At the end of the day, a machine tape is printed from each 
iVotronic that shows the time the machine was opened, the time it was 
closed, the precinct number, the number of votes recorded as cast for each 
office, and the total number of votes recorded as cast for each candidate. 
Once the tape has been printed, the poll manager reads the results aloud, 
signs the tape and delivers it, along with the PEBs to the county election 
office. 
When comparing the number of voters casting ballots to the number of votes 
on the machine, the poll manager checks the voter registration list. If the 
number of votes tabulated on the voting devices in any polling place exceeds 
the number of voters listed on the poll list, then the vote total for each 
candidate or issue is to be reduced by that fraction of the excess vote cast that 
his/her vote bears to the total number of votes cast in the polling place. A 
summary report of the votes cast at each polling place is posted for public 
viewing at each polling place. All emergency paper ballots and provisional-
challenged ballots are to be delivered in a locked box to the county election 
office as well. Poll managers should attempt to extract votes from inoperative 
voting machines at the precinct. If unsuccessful, then the voting device 
should be transported to the county election office for the extraction of the 
votes. The poll manager should post a notice at the polling place that says 
votes will be extracted at the county election office. 





In most instances, voters in a precinct should use the iVotronic. However, if 
paper ballots are used, then they are returned along with the other election 
materials at the end of the day to the county election officer where they will 
be scanned. Scanning creates an electronic file along with a paper tape of the 
scanned ballots. The digitized file is stored on a flash drive which allows the 
county election official or a state official auditing that county’s election to 
compare the election tabulation reports with the paper reports of the scanned 
ballots. 
Machine Audit Process in 
South Carolina 
The State Election Commission (SEC) initiated a post-election audit process 
in 2011, following problems with missing and unreported vote data identified 
in the 2010 general election. The SEC wrote an audit program which it 
provided to county election officials along with training in how to run a 
machine audit. This post-election machine audit process electronically 
compares the tabulated results of the election from reports generated by the 
Election Management System (EMS) with raw data collected from the 
iVotronic machines that are collected on removable flash cards after an 
election. Each voting machine is equipped with a flash card which records 
vote data used in the audit process. The post-election tabulation audit process 
compares the tabulated results collected from the iVotronic via the PEBs 
with audit data stored on the removable flash card in each machine. 
There is no voter verifiable paper audit trail that allows anyone to compare 
the votes as recorded by the voting machine with an independent record of 
each vote cast using that machine. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the 
term “audit,” the post-election process to which our iVotronic machines are 
subjected does not conform to the requirements of a comprehensive, 
compliance, investigative, or materiality election audit. However, the 
procedures in place do allow election officials to have confidence that all the 
votes recorded by a machine have been read and tabulated. If completed and 
published before an election is certified, these post-election tabulation audits 
might reassure the public that results are tabulated and reported fairly and 
accurately and that data are available to cross-check vote tabulations quickly 
and easily. The process also allows the SEC to identify those precincts that 
have a relatively high rate of problems for assistance and special training. 
These files detailing the results of the audit process appear on the State 
Election Commission website, SCVotes.org, for public access. 
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A characteristic of audits generally is the independence of the audit function 
from the behavior or transaction that is the focus of the audit. Based on our 
survey of counties, most South Carolina counties defer to the SEC to 
complete the post-election tabulation audits for their counties, others do not. 
That means that in some cases county election officials are auditing a 
function that they themselves perform. We reviewed the assignment of audit 
responsibilities in other states with a national expert on voting technology 
and election auditing practices. Where audits exist, it is rare that those who 
run the elections do not conduct the audit. Instead, where election officials 
conduct comprehensive election audits involving a comparison of votes 
recorded by DREs with a voter verifiable paper trail, the independence does 
not come from having a third party run the audit. It comes from having 
independent observers from the general public monitor the audit process in 
order to confirm its integrity. 
Post-election tabulation audit reports published on the SEC website have no 
date or time stamp indicating when they were completed. Therefore, the 
public has no way to verify that the audit was run prior to certification of the 
election. Moreover, the SEC website does not include a visible message to 
the public that the audit reports exist at all and does not provide instructions 
as to how these reports can be accessed. 
The audit reports lack any summary highlighting problems with the election 
and the voting machines. Data files are opened using a particular software 
package, but there are no instructions as to how to open the files or how to 
interpret them once they are opened. Data files referred to as “log” files are 
not clearly identifiable with titles that allow the reader to know the file 
contents. 
There is no evidence that state and county election officials formally analyze 
the data coming from the post-election tabulation audits in order to identify 
problems with the machines or their operation that might improve resource 
allocation in future elections. Analyzing the data in this way would add value 
to the audit process and allow election officials to identify maintenance 
problems, staffing and training needs, and machine placement requirements 
for various types of elections. 
Audit reports have no titles which indicate the elections to which they apply, 
and data files are not consistently labeled to reflect the elections to which 
they refer. We found no evidence of any codebook for users to access 
defining column headings and their meanings. 





Data and Format of Ballot 
Audit Reports 
The State Election Commission proposes to add explanatory statements to 
audit reports uploaded to its website after the 2012 general election. We 
reviewed the agency’s proposed language. The explanatory statements are 
long and include references to items that are themselves not explained. The 
most challenging problems exist with the ballot-level report and vote-level 
report which are the most substantive portions of the audit report. For 
example, statements include references to the EL30A, the M100, and M650. 
Without providing further description of these, or in the absence of a 
glossary, a reader could have difficulty interpreting the meaning of the data 
presented in these reports. Moreover, in an attempt to clarify their meaning, 
the State Election Commission might simply further confuse the reader who 
has to navigate a long narrative explanation to understand the election data. 
5.	 The General Assembly should enact a law requiring counties to perform Recommendations post-election tabulation audits, consistent with the current voting 
machine technology available, without voter verifiable paper trails, to be 
completed before any election is certified. 
6.	 The State Election Commission should post on its website an explanation 
that the post-election process, which the SEC calls an audit, is in fact, 
limited to a tabulation of data confirming the consistency of the 
machine’s memory and assuring only that the process accounts for votes 
as recorded by the machine itself. 
7.	 The State Election Commission should analyze the data in order to 
determine useful findings that could be used to improve resource 
allocation, staffing, and training needs in future elections. 
8.	 The State Election Commission should ensure that the audit reports on its 
website are user-friendly by: 
•	 Posting prominently on its website that audit reports exist and 
provide instructions on how they can be accessed. 
•	 Including date and time stamps on the reports indicating exactly 
when the audit was completed. 
•	 Stating clearly on the reports the specific election to which the report 
applies. 
•	 Defining the column headings and report titles. 
•	 Providing simple instructions in using the reports and data files. 
•	 Summarizing the results of the audit by concluding there were no 
problems or explaining any errors identified. 





Analysis of the Vote 
Tabulation Audit Reports 
from 2010–2012 
Post-election tabulation audit data and audit reports are available for the 
following elections: 
• 2010 general election. 
• 2012 presidential preference primary. 
• June 2012 primary. 
• June 2012 run-off elections. 
From 2010-2012, there are a total of 150 complete data files and audit 
reports. 
Local elections were included in the 2010 general election tabulation audits. 
However, the audits in 2012 are limited to elections for state office and 
higher. If the tabulation audits have value for the elections for which they are 
run, there is no reason for failing to incorporate the tabulation audit as part of 
the precertification requirements for local elections as well. 
The date by which county boards of canvassers must complete their work 
differs by election, but is no later than the Friday following the general 
election and the Thursday following a primary election. We conducted a 
survey of county election officials responsible for conducting the post-
election tabulation audit, and one of the issues addressed in that survey was 
the length of time required to run post-election audits prior to election 
certification. While respondents differed in the time they thought should be 
allowed between Election Day and the date an election is certified in order to 
complete all post-election activities, including a post-election audit, most 
generally agreed to a range from 3-7 days, depending on the type of election. 
Primaries and local elections, if they were to be subject to post-election 
audits, require less time while statewide and presidential elections generally 
require more. 
During the 2011-12 legislative session, legislation was introduced, but did 
not pass, that would have extended the number of days between Election Day 
and the day of certifications for primary and general elections. This same 
legislation would also require that post-election audits to correct or verify the 
election outcomes be completed by the county election commissions prior to 
certification of the election, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the State 
Election Commission. Missing ballots, machine shortages, accompanied by 
long lines in one county, coupled with miscues arising from variation in the 
way a candidate’s name appeared on different ballots in another county, are 
the kinds of issues that audits are designed to detect. We found no time 
requirements in state laws dealing with post-election audits in other states. 





9.	 The General Assembly should amend state law to require that Recommendations post-election machine tabulation audits be performed for all elections 
including local elections and that these post-election vote tabulation 
audits be completed before any results of those elections are certified. 
10. The General Assembly should amend state law to extend the length of 
time for certification of state and local elections to allow sufficient time 
to complete the post-election tabulation audits and resolve any problems 
identified by the audits. 
Independent Analyses of 
2010 General Election 
Independent experts have conducted their own audit of the 2010 South 
Carolina general election and found anomalies. Using the Freedom of 
Information Act, authors of this study obtained the vote image file, the vote 
terminal log files, and the log file for the program that tabulates vote totals in 
one South Carolina county for the November 2010 general election. The 
audit revealed some key problem areas: 
•	 The certified vote count for each of two of the county’s precincts was 
lower than the number of votes cast. Their analysis of the vote image 
showed 355 votes in one precinct and 772 votes from another precinct 
that did not appear to have been counted in the certified results. The 
authors speculated that the problem might have resulted from the misuse 
of PEBs, the tool used to open and close a voting machine, but this could 
not be confirmed. 
•	 For seven other precincts in this same county, the vote image files 
showed fewer votes in seven precincts than had been certified by the 
county’s election commission. While unable to confirm an explanation, 
these analysts reasoned that the vote image file was missing the entire 
vote data from as many as ten iVotronic machines. It appeared that 
someone failed to recognize that the number of votes certified failed to 
match the votes cast on the signature book. 
•	 The authors also expressed concern about the software in the iVotronic 
machines themselves. The proprietary software for the iVotronic 
machine is written to collect, store, retrieve, and manage the vote image 
data that is subsequently used to certify an election. According to the 
study, the software code did not require all the vote data to be collected 
and did not provide some electronic response for the person extracting 
the votes from these machines to know that he/she had failed to extract 
the votes from particular machines. 






•	 The independent audit identified two precincts where data was missing 
from both the event log and the vote image file. The data files are created 
as part of the audit process. The event log file is a file containing the 
voting machine number; the serial number of the PEB used to open and 
close that particular machine; and the date, time, and description of each 
event for each machine. The vote image file is a data file containing, for 
each precinct, the election ID and a record of each vote cast on each 
voting machine in each precinct. Votes from these precincts were 
certified but there was no record of these votes on the event log or the 
vote image file. The authors expressed concern as to the reason why this 
data would not have automatically been included in the vote image file. 
The authors could not understand why the software system would not 
have insisted that precinct data was stored in the vote image file. Authors 
assumed that the data existed but was not retrieved, thus representing 
another flaw in the software or the system relying on the software. 
The authors did not conclude that there existed fraud or other deliberate 
attempts to corrupt the vote. Instead, they blamed poorly written system 
software that failed to perform checks and balances to anticipate and check 
for errors. 
SEC Vote Tabulation 
Audits 
As a result of discrepancies uncovered in the 2010 general election, during 
the spring and summer of 2011, the SEC initiated a statewide audit process. 
Since then, audits were conducted for the following elections held in 2012: 
•	 For the 2012 Republican presidential preference primary, 46 counties 
were audited. Nine counties did their own audits, with the remaining 
conducted by the State Election Commission. 
•	 For the 2012 June primary, 43 vote tabulation audits were performed. 
Allendale and Clarendon counties did not have June 2012 primaries. No 
audit exists for Orangeburg county.
•	 For the June 2012 statewide primary run-off elections, 19 counties had 
run-off elections. Tabulation audits were conducted on all 19. 





A Review of the Audit Reports of the 2010 General Election 
We reviewed the audit reports of the 2010 general election. Four counties 
had no audit report available. The reports of 28 counties had missing audit 
data, indicating the potentially improper use of PEBs in extracting vote data 
from the iVotronic machines in those counties. Multiple PEBs were used to 
open and close machines, but it should be noted that the audit process is 
designed to ensure that all votes from the machines are counted. The reports 
of 14 counties indicated no problems with PEBs used. 
A Review of the Audit Reports of the 2012 Republican 
Presidential Preference Primary
Audit reports are available for 46 counties. In most cases there was no 
missing vote data. However, the audit process identified missing PEB data 
from two precincts in one county. An auditor’s comment at the bottom of the 
report for this county states that for each of the two precincts in question, one 
test ballot was included in the audit data. There is no missing PEB data and 
the correct number of votes was recorded. An auditor’s note recorded on the 
ballot audit report for another county reports that it experienced an error with 
the absentee and failsafe PEB. The machine automatically went into an 
alternative close process which required reading in data from the flash drive. 
This created a difference between two data files used to cross-check one 
another. According to the audit note in this county’s audit report, votes had 
to be extracted from the flash drive since there was a problem with the 
machine that recorded absentee balloting. There is no evidence that votes 
were lost. They merely had to be extracted using a flash drive. Multiple 
PEB’s were used to open and close voting machines in 24 counties and the 
report shows that some machines in 3 counties were not properly closed. 
A Review of the Audit Reports of the June 2012 Statewide 
Primary
Two counties, Allendale and Clarendon, did not host primaries. Of the 44 
counties with primaries, 43 had completed audits. The report from one 
county included a message concerning a printer problem, although the effect 
of that problem was unclear. The audits in five counties showed a difference 
among the log files. In Cherokee County, the difference was one vote, but the 
report offered no explanation for the difference. In Chesterfield County, the 
difference was 12. It appeared that 12 ballots were cancelled for being the 
“wrong ballot” but there is no way to confirm that. In Dorchester County, the 
difference was two, but, again, the report offers no explanation. The same is 
true for Lancaster with a difference of one and Marlboro with a difference of 
three. 





The lack of an explanation for the differences undermines public confidence 
in the integrity of the voting technology and the overall integrity and 
transparency of the entire election process. Reports for 20 counties indicate 
more than one PEB used to open and close a machine; and while this 
indicates human error, the report includes nothing to explain the material 
significance of this error. 
A Review of the Audit Reports of the June 2012 Statewide 
Primary Run-off 
Audit reports are available for all 19 counties which had runoff elections. 
The reports appropriately highlight problems with missing or test votes left 
on machines in three counties, although the problems or conditions involving 
downed machines or problems with vote extraction are not evident from the 
report formats. PEB problems continue in some counties with multiple PEBs 
used to open and close machines, but there is no evidence that this resulted in 
any votes failing to be included in the final tallies. The report reflected the 
multiple PEB use to open and close machines in six counties. 




Since the State Election Commission began performing post-election audits, 
the agency has identified the following issues: 
•	 Occasional failures in collecting all the iVotronic audit data. 
•	 Navigating the commands. 
•	 Occasional failures by some counties to name the files consistently. 
•	 Delaying the audit process until well after the election, which, when 
combined with other errors, has led to certification of incorrect results. 
•	 Occasional failures to follow SEC database standards for precinct names, 
number of groups in reports, and report headers. 
In response the SEC has made improvements to the automated process by 
providing additional training where technical improvements can no longer be 
made and deciding against reliance on the election night reporting to report 
election night results to the SEC. 
Actions by Counties 
The State Election Commission has directed counties to complete an audit 
for all elections for state and federal offices before certifying the election. 
Completed published audits exist for most counties in every election since 
2010. However, as we stated previously, we cannot confirm that the 
post-election tabulation audits were completed prior to certification since 
there is no date and time-stamp visible on the published reports with which to 
compare to an election certification date. 





Also, while some counties have performed their own audits, others rely on 
the SEC to run the post-election tabulation audits. Between 2010 and 2012, 
most counties have complied with this directive, although State Election 
Commission officials have found it necessary to complete many audits 
themselves because county officials have not done them. 
Survey of County 
Election Officials 
on the Post-Election 
Audit Process 
The State Election Commission provides training to local election officials in 
how to run a post-election tabulation audit. We conducted a survey of county 
officials responsible for post-election audits to determine their experience or 
recommendations for the audit process. Thirty-three (72%) of the 46 counties 
responded. 
Slightly more than one-third of the respondents report that they run their own 
audits. Most of the 13 had not encountered problems in running audits, but 3 
counties reported problems following the instructional manual. The reasons 
for not running a post-election audit in the county were — county staff were 
too few in number, insufficient time to run the audit, and a low comfort level 
in running the audits because they felt they needed more training. 
Twenty-nine of 33 counties had completed either the introductory course or 
that course and at least one refresher course. Nearly two-thirds felt that the 
training they received had equipped them with the skills necessary to run the 
audits. When considering changes to post-election audit training, respondents 
were evenly split between those who thought no changes were necessary and 
those who thought more time with hands-on experience would be helpful. 
Approximately one-third would like to see training videos posted online to 
view as needed. 
All of the counties stated that the audits are useful. The greatest benefit of 
these audits reported in the survey is that they reassure voters that all ballots 
have been counted. They also considered them useful in identifying precincts 
with problems, training needs for future elections, machines in need of 
repair, and reallocating machines for future elections. 
Most counties felt that between 3–7 days would be appropriate between 
election night and the date of certification in order to complete the 
post-election audits and other post-election activities. The time requirements 
could be varied depending on the type of election. 





11. The State Election Commission should record and post audit training Recommendations 
videos online in order to make them available as needed to county 
election officials. 
12. The State Election Commission should periodically assess training needs 
of county election officials in order to identify weaknesses in audit 






We reviewed the training available to county election officials and precinct 
managers to determine if it was adequate and appropriate. We found that the 
SEC could offer more training online and on the weekends. The SEC has 
also not offered training in various locations around the state, as required by 
state law. 
We found no evidence that county election commissioners and voter 
registration board members have been removed or replaced when they fail to 
comply with certification and training requirements. State law calls for 
removal by the Governor and proviso 79.7 in the FY 11-12 appropriations 
act states that the counties’ legislative delegations must replace non-
compliant members on the board or commission. 
Laws Governing Training	 State law requires county registration board members and county election 
commissioners and staff to complete, within 18 months after appointment or 
reappointment, a training and certification program conducted by the State 
Election Commission. One continuing education course is required annually 
thereafter. Failure to complete those requirements calls for notification to the 
Governor, who must remove the member from that board, unless an 
extension of time is granted by the Governor. 





Policies and Information 
About Training 
The State Election Commission provides core training seminars for election 
commissioners, voter registration board appointees (members) and county 
election staff to attain certification, and it determines which courses will be 
offered for each session. 
There are 3 types of certifications required for county members and staff, 
within 18 months after appointment or employment: 
•	 County voter registration and election commission members (members) 
are required to complete a total of seven courses — three core courses, 
two election electives, and two general components of choice. 
•	 County voter registration and election commission directors are required 
to complete eight courses — four core courses, two election electives, 
and two general components of choice. 
•	 County voter registration and election commission staff are required to 
complete five courses — two core courses, two election electives, and 
one component of choice. 
Core and elective courses are offered periodically for each type of 
certification. The State Election Commission determines a curriculum to 
satisfy the requirements for each of the training certificates. Once members 
become certified, at least one continuing education course is required 
annually in order to remain current. No testing is required to earn 
certification and continuing education. According to an SEC official, one 
core class is available online for commissioners and board members and 
others are being developed. Many classes utilize participation discussions of 
election issues which are not applicable to online training. 
The training is held in the SEC office in Columbia and led by current staff 
and SEC resources. There are no specific policies and procedures that guide 
training. The three training sessions that were offered in 2012 — April, July, 
and December — were held at the State Election Commission offices in 
Columbia. Proviso 79.7 states that the SEC shall make these courses 
available in various locations, including the upstate, coastal, and midlands 
areas of the state. The SEC states that the training sessions are not offered at 
various locations due to budget reductions. 
An SEC official described weaknesses in the program as keeping up with 
changes in elections, updating the various resource documents impacted by 
laws and rulings, and dealing with unknown future implications. 





Recommendation 13. The State Election Commission should offer core training courses for 
county election commissioners and voter registration board members and 
staff in various locations of the state, as required by proviso 79.7. 
Delinquent Reports for 
Certification and Training 
The State Election Commission sends to the county directors quarterly 
delinquent certification and training reports that show the training history of 
each election commissioner, voter registration board member, and staff in 
that county. It is the responsibility of the county directors to review the 
reports for non-compliance, notify the SEC of discrepancies, and ensure that 
staff attends the required training. 
According to the SEC, a summary copy is sent to the Governor annually, 
listing only the names, by county, of members who are delinquent in their 
certification and training requirements. The Governor’s office does not notify 
the SEC of actions taken for non-compliance. SEC records did not indicate 
any time extensions having been granted during 2012 for members to gain 
compliance. 
Copies of reports that were sent to county directors for quarters ending 
March 31 and June 30, 2012, showed: 
•	 24 counties had members who were non-compliant. 
•	 23 members were not certified and had served longer than 18 months. 
•	 3 certified members did not complete continuing ed training in 2010. 
•	 29 certified members did not complete continuing ed training in 2011. 
•	 20 members were certified from 1 to 11 years after their 18-month 
deadline. 
Stipends	 The election commissioners and voter registration board members may be 
paid a stipend of up to $1,500 per year, not to exceed $12,500 per county, 
according to proviso 79.1 in the FY 11-12 appropriations act. Proviso 79.7 
states that the SEC is required to withhold stipends if those members do not 
complete the training and certification program as required by state law. The 
SEC notifies each county treasurer after the end of each quarter of members 
in that county who are eligible to be paid stipends, and the amount of the 
stipend, and those who are ineligible to be paid. 





We examined copies of the memos that were sent to the 46 county treasurers 
on July 13, 2012. We found that only active election commissioners and 
voter registration board members were paid stipends in the fourth quarter of 
FY 11-12. Members who were listed on the 6-30-12 Delinquent Training 
Program report for the Governor were correctly named in the county memos 
as ‘ineligible’ and were not paid a stipend for service. A total of $102,227.64 
was paid to certified members after the fourth quarter of FY 11-12. A total of 
$13,590.26 was withheld from those members who were not compliant 





We found no evidence that county election commissioners and voter 
registration board members have been removed or replaced when they fail to 
comply with certification and training requirements. The division of boards 
and commissions of the Governor’s office is responsible for removing any 
election members who are non-compliant in their certification and continuing 
education training, as required by state law. Proviso 79.7, in the 
appropriations act since FY 08-09, states that the counties’ legislative 
delegations must replace non-compliant members on the board or 
commission. 
Recommendation 14. Election commissioners and voter registration board members who fail to earn training certification within the established time period should be 
removed and replaced. 
Training for Poll Workers	 S.C. Code §7-13-72 states that no person may be appointed as a precinct 
manager who has not been certified as having completed a training program 
concerning his duties and responsibilities as a precinct manager. The training 
program must be approved by the State Election Commission but is carried 
out by the county election commission. 
According to an SEC training official, precinct managers (workers) and 
clerks (lead managers) are provided online training in setting up the precincts 
and managing the machines. A county trainer further explained that the 
clerks are responsible for the activity of the precincts. Their instruction is 
more extensive with hands-on training in opening, closing, and reporting 
procedures with the machines. Precinct managers are paid a per diem of $60 
for two days and precinct clerks are paid a per diem of $60 for three days. 





The SEC prepares online training courses for precinct managers and clerks. 
There are ten modules in the online poll manager course, composed of 
lectures, activities, and videos, and most are concluded with a course quiz. A 
user survey of the entire course is required for feedback before full credit is 
given for the training. Topics include setting up and closing the polling 
places, processing voters, solving voting day issues, and serving voters with 
disabilities. One module includes tutorials for opening and closing the 
iVotronic voting machines, and others address printing zero tapes and closing 
tapes with voting results. 
Training Survey of 
County Election Directors 
We sent a survey to the 46 county election directors regarding training that is 
provided by the State Election Commission. Thirty-six of the 46 (78.3%) 
county election directors responded. The survey focused on core training for 
commissioners and directors, as well as online and other training for poll 
managers and clerks. 
Thirty-three (91.7%) of the respondents agreed that the SEC offers enough 
core classes to achieve the mandatory certification within 18 months for 
board members and staff. Three responded that more classes should be 
scheduled and at more convenient times. Three requested online core 
training, and expressed a need for more training than they are getting. Other 
comments referred to the lack of classes and alternatives, such as online 
training or week-end classes, and that they would like to see more classes for 
directors and commissioners. 
Thirty (83.3%) agreed that SEC training is adequate to perform specific 
election jobs. Five comments expressed concern that managers get no core 
training in audit processes, such as Unity, iVotronic, VREMS, scanning, etc. 
(see Survey of County Election Officials on the Post-Election Audit Process). 
One concern was directed to Unity, the system used to prepare voting 
machines for elections. Other than the initial training received when the 
machines were new in 2004, there has been no continuing education and new 
appointees and new hires get no training on Unity. 
All 36 responses asserted that their precinct managers get training and 
instructions other than online training provided by the SEC. Thirty-three 
(91.7%) responded that first-time poll managers also get personal training, in 
addition to online training. 







Thirty-five counties (97.2%) reported that precinct clerks get training in 
addition to SEC online courses for running the precincts, and 36 (100%) 
reported that precinct clerks get hands-on training on the machines. All 
counties responded that precinct clerks are provided a checklist of procedures 
for opening the polls and another checklist for closing the polls, operating the 
voting machines, and reporting the total votes. 
Counties are responsible for assuring that precinct managers and clerks are 
trained to manage the precincts. Satisfactory completion of the online 
training is required prior to each election and before per diems are paid for 
managing the polls. Precinct workers are provided a poll managers handbook 
for study and reference. Online training, personal instructions from the 
county offices, and familiarity with the poll managers handbook prepares 
poll managers and clerks to effectively operate the voting precincts on 
Election Day.
Other States	 We were asked to evaluate other states’ methods of training their election 
officials. In a review of Election Administration Profiles of All Fifty States, 
published by the Center for Democracy and Election Management, we found 
no state that offered online courses for election officials and county board 
members. Some states were then contacted for additional information. South 
Carolina and three other states provided online training for their precinct 
workers. 
Only one state was identified that requires testing of its county board 
members, directors, and staff before they are granted certification. Offering 
online training to election officials and county board members would: 
•	 Avoid inconvenient meeting locations and travel expense. 
•	 Accommodate the individual’s personal schedule to acquire training. 
•	 Strengthen learning when tested, by allowing instant review of problem 
areas. 
Recommendations 15. The State Election Commission should evaluate the training offered to 
election officials, directors, and staff to determine if training can be 
offered online, or on weekends, or if additional training courses are 
needed. 
16. The State Election Commission should consider testing officials, 
directors, and staff on core training to assure understanding of election 
rules and laws. 











Types of Voting 
Machines 
We evaluated other voting machines currently available to determine the 
features and costs of those machines. We found that there are options 
available and the experiences of other states with those machines should be 
considered when deciding which machine to use. 
There are two broad categories of voting machines, direct recording 
electronic (DRE) machines and voter-marked paper ballots/ballot scanners. 
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) established requirements for 
voting systems used in federal elections and requires that every polling place 
have a voting method that allows the disabled to vote in privacy. HAVA does 
not require a specific type of voting system but provides incentives for states 
to replace punch card and lever voting machines. According to 
VerifiedVoting.org, two-thirds of voters in the United States voted using 
voter-marked paper ballots and 25% used paperless electronic voting 
machines in the 2012 elections. 
Table 2.2: Nationwide Voting 




Voter-marked Paper Ballots/Ballot Scanners and/or 
hand count 
67,592,032 (37%) 
DRE Machines with no Voter-Verifiable Paper Record 45,021,727 (25%) 
Voter-marked Paper Ballots/Ballot Scanners and 
DREs with Paper Record 
33,572,723 (19%) 
Voter-marked Paper Ballots/Ballot Scanners and 
DREs with no Paper Record 
19,501,550 (11%) 
DRE Machines with a Voter-Verifiable Paper Record 14,699,685 (8%) 
DRE Machines with and without Paper Record 345,276 (0.19%) 
Punch Card Voting Systems 69,379 (0.04%) 
TOTAL 180,802,372 
Source: VerifiedVoting.org 
In all counties, South Carolina uses DRE machines with no voter-verifiable 
paper record (see Procurement of Voting Machines). 
The use of optical scan equipment has increased significantly from 2000 to 
2008. DRE machine use had been increasing but, from 2006 to 2008, the use 
of the machines declined. Chart 2.3 illustrates the changes in the types of 
voting equipment used by percentage of registered voters from 2000 to 2008. 










Chart 2.3: Type of Voting
 











Source: Election Data Services, Inc. 
Voter-Marked Ballot Scanners 
This voting system uses optical scan equipment, similar to that used for 
testing, where voters mark their choices on paper ballots or on ballot-
marking devices, electronic machines which print the ballot. The ballots are 
read by a scanner which is an electronic counting device. The scanner can be 
located at the precinct where the ballot is scanned as soon as the voter 
completes the ballot or the ballots can be collected and taken to another 
location such as the county election office where all of the ballots are 
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Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Machines 
On this voting system, voters mark choices via a computer interface and the 
voting machines record them directly to an electronic memory. These are the 
type of machines used in South Carolina (see Procurement of Voting 
Machines). The machines can also be equipped to produce a paper ballot 
which can be verified by the voter. These machines are best used when 
voting is spread out over several days. 
Alternative Voting 
Systems 
Some states use different methods of voting. 
•	 A few states, including Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, conduct 
their voting by mail, either statewide or by county. In those areas, ballots 
are mailed to voters who can return the completed ballots by mailing 
them, by dropping them at designated centers or 24-hour drop boxes, or 
by returning them to polling centers on Election Day. 
•	 In 2011, Oregon conducted a pilot using iPads for 89 disabled voters. 
After entering the choices on the iPad, the ballots were printed out, 
verified, and mailed. 
•	 Some states, including Mississippi and North Carolina, allow use of the 
Internet to access and return ballots for overseas and military voters. In 
2012, New Jersey also allowed voters affected by Hurricane Sandy to fax 
or email completed ballots. 
Costs of Voting Machines	 There are several factors to be considered when evaluating the cost of voting 
machines. The initial cost of the machines as well as the operating cost of the 
machines should be evaluated. Table 2.4 shows the purchase price of the 
voting machines in 2004 and 2005 which are currently used in South 
Carolina. 
Table 2.4: Purchase Price of S.C. 
Voting Machines 
Page 43 	 LAC/12-1 Voting Machines 
TYPE OF MACHINE 
MACHINES COST PER 
 TOTAL PRICE PURCHASED MACHINE 
Voting machines 9,393 $2,995 $28,132,035 
ADA Voting machines 2,005 $3,195 $6,405,975 




These machines were purchased with federal funds and distributed to the 
counties. If a county needs additional or replacement machines, it is 
responsible for purchasing them. These machines are no longer 
manufactured, so any additional individual machines needed would be 
machines refurbished from another jurisdiction. 
Under state law, any voting machines used by the counties must be approved 
by the State Election Commission. According to S.C. Code §7-13-1620(A), a 
voting system must be certified by a lab accredited by the federal Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC) before the state can approve it. The EAC is 
currently without commissioners although it is still certifying voting systems 
(see Legal Requirements for Voting Machines). The state may approve more 
than one system. 
Other states have purchased DREs and optical scan systems. 
•	 In 2009, Maryland approved a lease for an optical scan voting system 
from Election Systems and Software (ES&S) with a base price of 
$14 million and voting system support services from Cirdan Group for 
$20.9 million for 3 years. The state has 2,083 precinct scanners at 
$7,313 each and 34 central tabulators for absentee or provisional ballots 
at $42,144 each. 
•	 Texas counties could purchase a Hart eSlate DRE for $2,900 each, an 
ES&S iVotronic unit for $2,500 each, or a Diebold AccuVote TS DRE 
for $3,195 from 2005 through 2011. 
Some vendors offer a volume discount for purchases of a large number of 
machines. These discounts could range from 1% to 15% depending on the 
number purchased. 
The operating costs of the machines should also be considered when 
determining the cost of voting machines because the initial cost of the 
machines is a small percentage of the overall cost of the machines. Several 
factors contribute to the operating costs including percentage of early voting, 
cost of ballots, number of elections per year, programming, training, 
transportation, and storage. An analysis of election expenditures for four 
counties in North Carolina from FY 04-05 through FY 07-08 found that the 
cost per registered voter in two counties with optical scanners was $3.63 and 
$5.54 while the cost per registered voter in two counties with DREs was 
$7.22 and $7.46. The average cost per registered voter for 29 counties in S.C. 
was $4.34 in FY 10-11. 









The state has a few options concerning its voting machines — keep the 
current machines as is or add a voter-verified paper audit trail, have a 
statewide procurement for new voting machines, or approve different types 
of voting machines and have the counties purchase their own machines. 
Keep the Current Voting Machines 
When the iVotronic machines were purchased, they had a useful life of 
12–15 years and are about halfway through the recommended time period. 
The limitations with the current machines are that the machines are no longer 
made, so additional or replacement machines are refurbished from other 
states, and the machines do not have a voter-verified paper audit trail. A used 
machine costs $1,795, a handicap-accessible, used machine costs $1,995, and 
a used precinct scanner costs $4,250. The counties are responsible for 
purchasing additional or replacement machines. 
To add a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) to each machine would 
cost $1,445 per unit plus shipping and handling. There are approximately 
12,000 voting machines in the state so the total cost of adding a VVPAT to 
each machine would be about $17,340,000 (see Possibility of Adding a 
Paper Audit Trail). 
Statewide Procurement of New Voting Machines 
The current voting machines were procured using the state procurement 
process and one type of machine was selected for the entire state. Federal 
funds were used to purchase these machines. There is no indication that 
federal funds will be available to purchase voting machines. If there are no 
federal funds available, the state would have to provide the funding to 
purchase a new voting system. The SEC requested $5 million to establish a 
fund to pay for a new voting system in the FY 12-13 budget, however, it was 
not appropriated the funding. The SEC has repeated this request for the 
FY 13-14 budget. Because it will be a significant amount of money, the 
funding should be spread out over a number of years. 
The procurement process for the current voting system included a committee 
of state- and local-level election experts who developed the system 
requirements. A panel of election experts evaluated the proposals to select 
the current system. If the state decides to conduct another statewide 
procurement for voting systems, input should be sought from a wide variety 
of sources. For example, Los Angeles County in California has implemented 
a process to obtain input from the public, the academic community, public 
interest organizations, and policy makers. 
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Chapter 2 
Audit Results 
Counties Purchase Machines from State-Approved List 
S.C. Code §7-13-1620 requires that the SEC approve any voting system used 
in the state, however, it does not limit the number of voting systems that can 
be approved. Very few states have statewide voting systems and instead 
allow each county to select the voting system appropriate for its needs, 
usually from a state-approved list. The counties are responsible for providing 
the funding to purchase the machines as well as operating expenses. 
By allowing each county to purchase its own machines, there will be no 
uniformity and less oversight by the state. It does allow each county to 
evaluate its needs and select the most appropriate system based on the 
number of registered voters, number of precincts, funding, etc. 
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Appendix 
Agency Comments 
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